Aristotle on Justice: A Defense

            In this paper, I shall address two central contemporary criticisms of Aristotle’s conception of justice. These criticisms of Aristotle’s account of specific justice have focused on two central problems. First, Aristotle’s insistence that all specifically unjust actions are motivated by pleonexia Footnote . Second, Aristotle does not identify a deficient vice with respect to justice. This violates his “golden mean” doctrine with respect to virtue. Without the identification of the deficient vice with respect to justice, then justice must not be a virtue of character.  Due to considerations of time and length of this paper, I shall confine myself to addressing the initial criticism. Footnote

            The criticism I am concerned with here challenges the notion that specific justice is a moral virtue. I shall argue that the solution to this challenge is to carefully distinguish between the results arising from mis-distributions of these social goods, the concern of specific distributable justice, and the resulting harm to others. I shall argue that there is an objectively specific unjust feature to these mis-distributions that requires rectificatory justice. In response to the first criticism, I shall argue that this criticism, in effect, fails to do justice to Aristotle’s distinction between general and specific justice. In cases where an agent commits an act of general injustice, rectificatory justice is needed to address the resulting imbalance in the distribution pattern of social goods Footnote . Hence, if this criticism is intended to undermine Aristotle’s account of specific justice, by requiring another species of specific justice to rectify these imbalances, it fails accordingly.

            In order to address these criticisms, it will be necessary to clearly and briefly work out Aristotle’s notions of general and specific justice and their relationship to one another. In this next section, I shall address Aristotle’s discussion of general justice. Since general justice promotes virtuous behavior by means of the law’s pedagogical role, it will be necessary to understand this claim. It is my position that general justice holds members of a community accountable to standards of mutual obligation. These standards of mutual obligation, the virtues of character, establish recognized and accepted forms of behavior that form the basis of law. Failing to act in light of these standards results in harm to others and justifies the use of punishment. This aspect of general justice is important because it directly bears on the first criticism.

            Next, I shall examine specific justice and its relation to the social goods. Thereafter, I shall address the main criticism of Aristotle’s theory of specific justice and draw out the implications of this reading.

Section 1: Forms of Justice: General and Specific

            In general, justice is defined as the state that makes us doers of just actions, that makes us do justice and wish what is just (NE 1129a8). There is one immediate difference between justice and the other virtues of character. Justice is spoken of in two ways: the lawful and the fair. Because there are two different ways in which someone can be just, there are two different virtues being analyzed. Aristotle distinguishes between these two virtues by first specifying general justice as the lawful, and by referring to it as complete virtue in its fullest sense because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue (NE1129b30). Specific justice is concerned with having one’s fair share either in some distributable good, in rectifying harms done to one by receiving less than one’s fair share of a distributable good, or in obtaining one’s fair share in an exchange. Specific justice is a part of the whole of general justice. Terence Irwin has correctly indicated that the two types of justice are homonymous not only by having the name in common. They also have connected definitions. Footnote The fair is not the same as the lawful, but they are related to one another in a ‘parts to the whole’ relationship. General justice is concerned with the whole of virtue, and this concern guides the discussion of the lawful found below. Specific justice is concerned with the distribution of honors or wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a community who share in a political system (NE1130b33). Hence, the lawless person and the pleonektic Footnote person are unjust, but the lawless person does not necessarily have to be pleonektic.

            For Aristotle, there is a distinct value to human actions when the virtues are expressed in the actions of individuals in relation to each other. This view can be understood in two contexts. Learning to be courageous, one must use fear and confidence in different contexts. Being courageous also entails acting for the right end, toward the right people, in the right way, about the right things. Defending one’s home, fighting against invaders, when they are attacking the state to preserve one’s family and friends is an example of the application of these qualifications on the virtue of courage. Considering how this action affects the overall well being of others, we are considering how the action is generally just. In sum, the distinction being made here is that the same virtue can be seen all by itself, as a part of the character of an individual only, and where the virtue is in relation to another person in a particular political community, and its effects on the well being of others in that political community. We have the same state considered from different perspectives.

            Aristotle says that justice is spoken of in two ways: as lawful and as fair. I will discuss general justice first in order to distinguish it from specific justice. Generally speaking, general justice is concerned with the common good of the community. In the Politics, Aristotle refers to justice as being a communal virtue. “Similarly, then, we shall say that virtue has a just claim in the dispute, since [general] justice, we say, is a communal (koinoniken) virtue, which all the other virtues necessarily accompany” (Pol.1283a36-39 trans. Reeve [modified]). This communal or relational aspect of justice shows up both in general and specific justice. I shall discuss the communal or relational aspect of specific justice below.

            In general justice, the communal aspect can be seen in Aristotle’s definition of the end of law. “The laws aim either at the common benefit of all, or at the benefit of those in control, whose control rests on virtue or on some other such basis (NE1129b15-18).” This definition is intended to cover both the complete and deviant conceptions of law. Law properly conceived aims at the common benefit of all. The deviant cases aim at the benefit of those in control. The properly constructed constitution of the polis aims at the general happiness of its members. Happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue, and the laws are, if properly designed, to promote that end. The law instructs us to perform actions reflective of the virtues, and prohibits us from performing actions which are reflective of the vices. In the case where the laws promote virtuous actions, the laws bind the polis and develop a sense of community. The laws, then, reinforce communal standards of obligation, and foster communal safety, while at the same time provide a venue for airing complaints between members of the community. In the case where the laws are designed to promote the interests of the ruler or rulers, the laws work against the development of the community. When the laws work to promote the interest of the ruler or rulers, the laws are used to justify inequities and these lead to factions. I shall address this more fully below. Different sets of virtues are promoted in the complete constitutions than in those which are deficient.

            Terence Irwin argues that general justice is not a feature of one virtue in opposition to another, but the feature of virtue of character as a whole. General justice turns out to be the same state of character as virtue as a whole, and calling it general justice, we refer to the concerns of the virtuous person for the common good of the political community. Footnote What I understand Irwin to be saying is that the concern of the virtuous person for the well being of others is the concern of the just person for the well being of the community. Justice is seen as another person’s good, and this concern for the well being of others in the community is what I think Aristotle is trying to capture here.

            Aristotle argues that the law commands all the virtuous acts that contribute to the happiness of the political community. Therefore, general justice is not a particular virtue but includes all of the virtues. Footnote Fred Miller has argued that general justice and ethical virtue are the same state, but these differ in being in that justice is seen as a virtue in relation to others. Miller has argued that someone might be able to exercise the virtues of character in one’s own actions without being able to express these towards others. His position is derived from the discussion found in Nicomachean Ethics 1130a10 and 1129b30. I maintain that this does not take into consideration those toward whom the virtues are directed. Instead, the proper way of thinking of the difference between general justice and ethical virtue is as follows. If we are considering a particular act and its relation to either another person or a specific social context not that of the entire city, then this consideration is one of ethical virtue. On the other hand, if we are considering how a particular action affects the general well being of the whole community, then this is a matter of general justice.

            Since general justice is identified with complete virtue, and happiness is understood as an activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue, then the laws constitute the formal aspect of the polis that aim at developing the moral character of the members of that polis. Moreover, if the polis is the complete development of the community, and the laws aim at the happiness of the community, then some sense of common good should be expressed in the laws. Since ethical virtue is the same state of character as general justice, the regular behavior of the virtuous establish a sense of an acceptable norm or custom. The custom or norm in question is one where the end of the activity aims at the noble (kalon). Virtuous behavior of individuals in the community in relation to one another establish a reasonable basis for the maintenance and well being of the community. The written laws of the community are, if properly designed, to promote the virtuous actions of the citizens. Likewise, vicious behavior of individuals in the community in relation to one another enable us to identify the types of harm done. The punishment of those who violate the laws would aim, I suggest, at the moral correction of the individual in question.

            Having discussed the nature and role of general justice, in the subsequent section, I shall provide an account of specific justice and how this virtue of character relates to the social goods. Here the agent’s attitude to these social goods, and the desire to have a proportionate share in the distribution of them guides Aristotle’s discussion.

Section 2: Specific Distributive Justice

            One expression of the concern that the virtuous person has for the common good of the political community is captured in three types of specific justice. In specific justice, our disposition to natural goods plays a role. Unlike general justice, specific justice involves a group of goods Aristotle calls natural goods. As a subset of the natural goods, the social goods are those that are capable of being distributed in a society.

            In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle discusses the natural goods. The natural goods are described as things which all men fight for and think are the greatest.

A good man, then is one for whom the natural goods are good. For the goods men fight for and think the greatest - honor, wealth, bodily excellences, good fortune, and power - are naturally good, but may be to some hurtful because of their disposition. For neither the imprudent nor the unjust nor the intemperate would get any good from the employment of them (EE1248b26 - 31 trans. Rackham).


            These natural goods are further discussed in the following passages. “Now things good have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and goods of the soul and of the body on the other” (NE1098b13-14). Footnote The use of the external goods in relation to the disposition of the agent is also reflected in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle considers the harm that the wrong disposition to these goods can have. “And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage” (NE 1094b 16 - 18). The relationship between these goods and an agent’s disposition to them is further explained in the Politics.

For since, in the case of one division at least, there are three groups - external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul - surely no one would raise a dispute and say that not all of them need be possessed by those who are blessedly happy. For no one would call a person blessedly happy who has no shred of courage, temperance, justice, or practical wisdom, but is afraid of the flies buzzing around him, stops at nothing to gratify his appetites for food or drink, betrays his dearest friends for a pittance, and has a mind as foolish and prone to error as a child’s or a madman’s (Pol.1323a24-35 trans. Reeve).


The bodily excellences of health and beauty, being goods of the body, are not goods which a society could distribute. I define the social goods as a subset of the natural goods that are available for distribution in a society, namely: wealth, honor, and safety, where honor subsumes the Eudemian discussion of power. By honor, I mean both political office and other honors. The existence of these goods is made possible because people live in communities. They have a social dimension because of this. These are the disputed goods, and are the ones that the focus of the motivation of specific justice is concerned. The external goods that Aristotle may be talking about are offices, honors, and possibly land grants, and the division of spoils of war. Our disposition to these external goods and their place in our overall happiness plays an important role in the discussion of justice. In the Politics, there is a brief discussion of this relationship.

Some consider a small degree of virtue sufficient and unlimited amounts of wealth to be the blessedly happy life. But the virtues are not acquired and preserved by means of external goods, but the other way around. The happy life for a human being whether it consists in pleasure or virtue or both, is possessed more often by those who have cultivated their character and minds to an excessive degree, but have been moderate in their acquisition of external goods, than by those who have acquired more of the latter than they can possibly use, but are deficient in the former (Pol. 1323a40-1323b5 trans. Reeve).


            The passage from the Politics echoes some of the discussion of the role the external goods have in enabling an agent to perform the means to exercise virtue.

The answer to the question we are asking is plain from the definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of the soul of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments (NE1099b 25 - 28 trans. Irwin).

These goods are instrumental to action, and being properly supplied with them seems to be needed in order for someone to excel in happiness. John Cooper has argued that these external goods are needed and effective instruments in and doing of some of virtuous actions. In “Goods of Fortune” Footnote , Cooper focuses his discussion on passages in Nicomachean Ethics (1101a15 and 1153b17-19) where Aristotle considers the components of happiness. The happy person is one who expresses complete virtue in his activities, with an adequate supply of external goods throughout a complete life. Richard Kraut Footnote argues that these external goods are not constitutive elements of happiness. Rather, they are merely instrumental goods needed to enable the happy person to act virtuously. Without these instrumental goods, the opportunities for virtuous action are impeded. Cooper correctly argues that the external goods are instrumental in his consideration of how the use of these goods makes the task of virtuous action less impeded. Cooper Footnote uses the example of the carpenter having the proper tools for which to make a table to illustrate this relationship. Without having a hammer or saw, the task of making a table is more difficult. Lacking these tools, the carpenter may decide that making a table cannot be done, and if he does undertake making a table without these tools, his work will be far more difficult. Footnote

            Distributive justice is the form of specific justice that is concerned with distributing a proportionately equal share of some social good. These goods are the external goods: wealth, honor, and safety (NE1130b3). These external goods are referred to as the things which bring good and bad fortune and are a subdivision of them. Although I have not said much about the things which bring bad fortune, and the texts do not provide us a list of these things, one could infer from the text that things like poverty, dishonor and unsafety would count. Rectificatory justice is concerned with addressing harms done to others resulting in unjust distribution, and restoring goods to individuals. The moral worth of the parties in conflict is not a concern for rectificatory justice. If a virtuous person harmed a vicious person, the virtue and vice of the individuals in question is not the main concern in this connection. The harm done is what is important. In specific rectificatory justice, the concern is with restoring goods to the victim and taking them away from the culprit. Footnote Reciprocal justice is concerned with equality in exchange of goods. The exchange of goods in economic relationships and use of the equal as a form of measurement between objects of different values in exchange seems to be its concern.

            The motivation for specific justice is the desire to have a proportionate share of some socially available good (NE1130b1). Aristotle considers the extremes of injustice to be either causing harm or suffering from harm. The harm involved here depends on the analysis of the action in question. Generally speaking, specific justice, then, is motivated by the desire for what is equal or what is fair. The word that Aristotle uses is ison which means both ‘equal’ or ‘fair’, as in fair share. In connection with specific justice, desiring to have one’s fair share of some distributable good would be the mean between desiring to have an unequal share, whether too great or too small. Determining whether one has a fair share or an equal share depends on the worth of the individual in question.

            The Nicomachean Ethics leaves the question of worth open.

This is also clear from considering what fits a person’s worth. For everyone agrees that what is just in distributions must fit some sort of worth, but what they call worth is not the same; supporters of democracy say that it is free citizenship, some supporters of oligarchy say it is wealth, others good birth, while supporters of aristocracy say it is virtue (NE1131a 24 - 28 trans. Irwin).

What is considered to be a person’s worth depends on the constitution of the polis in question. Democratic states consider free citizenship to be the worth of the individual. Aristocratic states consider virtue to be the defining worth of the individual. Once worth is determined, dividing the shares would entail evaluating the merit of the individual in question in relation to the merit of others, and the value of the divisible good, to ensure that a fair or equal disbursement was performed. This is similar to a concept in American law: the concept of pro rata distributions. An example of this kind of distribution can be seen in the distribution of funds in bankruptcy. In a chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, the trustee would add the claims together to get a total, then divide the total amount of claims into the funds available for distribution to obtain a percentage. Each claim is then multiplied by the percentage to arrive at the pro rata distribution amount.

            Aristotle use of analogon is similar to our modern use of pro rata or proration. It should be noted that in evaluating the claims made in a pro rata distribution, the idea of making a claim, and of using supportive documents or facts to support one’s claim does not involve the notion of rights. In American law, the concept of rights is not used in the courts of equity, as opposed to criminal courts. One body of American law that is analogous to the type of law Aristotle is advocating, is tort law. Footnote As a branch of civil law, an area of tort includes some of the examples that Aristotle gives of transactions contrary to intentions. Since civil cases can be brought to the court for slander, assault, trespass of property, and even theft, other examples of unjust actions would fall under the domain of criminal law, murder, for example. In contrast to civil law, criminal law provides for the prosecution, usually by agents of the state, of persons accused of crimes for which, if found guilty, they are liable to punishment. In the case of criminal law, Aristotle’s discussion of general justice finds its modern analogue.

            Aristotle says the motivation of specific injustice stems from pleonexia. Pleonexia can be understood as the desire to have more of some socially available good, and is usually translated as greed or acquisitiveness. Pleonexia is seen by Aristotle as the root of social unrest. In the Politics, Aristotle discusses the desire to have more of external goods and its effect on social harmony.

The principle general cause of people being in some way disposed to change their constitution is the one we have in fact already mentioned. For those who desire equality start faction when they believe that they are getting less (elatton echein), even though they are the equals of those who are getting more (pleonektousin); whereas those who desire inequality (that is to say superiority) do so when they believe that, though they are unequal, they are not getting more (pleon echein), but the same or less (ison e elatton). Sometimes these desires are just, sometimes unjust. For inferiors start faction in order to be equal, and equals do so in order to be superior. So much the conditions of those who start faction. The things over which they start such faction are profit, honor, and their opposites. For people also start faction in city-states to avoid dishonor and fines, either for themselves or for their friends. . . . For people are also stirred up by profit and by honor not simply in order to get them for themselves, which is what we said before, but because they see others, whether justly or unjustly getting more (pleonektountas) (Pol.1302a22-40 trans. Reeve).

These external goods and the distribution of them are the source of factions within the city-state. Aristotle’s discussion here focuses on two different cases. Those who are equal and those who are unequal. In the case of those who are equal, the belief that they are receiving less profit or honor than others, who are their equal, is a source of strife and may lead to faction. In the case of those who are unequal, the belief that they are not receiving more profit or honor may lead to strife or faction. Although Aristotle’s use of ‘getting more’ and ‘getting less’ is a non-technical use of these words, this passage does illuminate the effect of the distribution of these social goods. I understand the use of the phrase “unjustly getting more” to indicate those cases where the expectation of the distribution pattern to be equal, in the case of equals, or where the expectation of the distribution pattern to be more in the case of superiors but actually receiving either less or an equal distribution, in the case of unequals. The use of “justly getting more” indicates those conditions where the distribution pattern is properly operating, but the desire of those to change the constitution is stirred up by these social goods in order to obtain more of them. In either case, it is the distribution of these social goods that are at the root of social unrest. “The things over which they start such faction are profit and honor, and their opposites. For people also start faction in city-states to avoid dishonor and fines, either for themselves or for their friends” (Pol.1302a31-33). This point is further brought out in those cases when officials use their position in the government to obtain more of these social goods. When officials use their office as a means to plunder the wealth of others or of the collective, they act out of pleonexia. In the Politics, Aristotle discusses the effects of the greediness of officials or, in other words, the selfishness involved when officials act acquisitively.

The effect of arrogance and profit, and the way the two operate, are pretty much evident. For when officials behave arrogantly and become acquisitive (pleonektounton), people start faction with one another and with the constitution that gave the officials authority. (Sometimes their acquisitiveness (pleonexia) is at the expense of private properties, sometimes at that of public funds) (Pol.1302b5-9 trans. Reeve).

            By acting selfishly, the pleonektic person acts under the assumption that by possessing large amounts of wealth, he will be happy. Or, on the other hand, the pleonektic person acts under the assumption that by obtaining a greater amount of what is honorable, he will be happy. The pleonektic person does not take others into consideration and their claims to these goods. The unjust person, then, has a base conception of self-love, which is clearly selfish.

Those who make self-love a matter for reproach ascribe it to those who award the biggest share in money, honors, and bodily pleasures to themselves. For these are the goods desired and eagerly pursued by the many on the assumption that they are the best; and hence they are also contested. Those who are greedy (pleonektai) for these goods gratify their appetites and in general their feelings and the non-rational part of the soul; and since this is the character of the many, the application of the term [self-love] is derived from the most frequent [kind of self-love], which is base. This type of self-lover, then, is justifiably reproached (NE1168b 15 - 22 trans. Irwin).

            Aristotle’s account of justice as a virtue, and the motivation of specifically unjust acts stemming from pleonexia, has come under criticism. The criticism I shall address here challenges Aristotle’s claim that all unjust actions are motivated by pleonexia. If it can be shown that Aristotle is wrong in his characterization of this virtue, then justice is not a virtue of character at all, but a quality of political communities only. In the next section I shall address this criticism. What I intend to provide is a reading of Aristotle’s account of justice that not only addresses this, but illuminates an objectively specific unjust aspect of mis-distributions of these social goods.

Section 3: Modern Criticism of Specific Justice

            Bernard Williams, in “Justice as a Virtue”, has criticized Aristotle’s account of specific justice. His central thesis is that Aristotle’s characterization of the motivation of unjust acts stemming from pleonexia is too narrow, and does not adequately account for all unjust acts. Therefore it cannot be appealed to as the defining motivation characterizable as unjust. In order to support his position, Williams launches several arguments which appeal to other motivations to deny Aristotle’s position.

            Williams writes:

It is obvious that an unjust act (those that are vicious acts but not the acts of a vicious person) need not be motivated by the desire for gain at all. To take Aristotle’s paradigmatic distribution case, a person could on a particular occasion, be overcome by hopes of sexual conquest, or malice against one recipient, and so knowingly make an unjust distribution, and his act would surely be an unjust act. Footnote


Let us look at this initial argument in detail and examine the examples used to support Williams’ position. In first example, a person, who on one occasion, is overcome by hopes of sexual conquest and so knowingly makes an unjust distribution. The question is, is this a case of pleonexia? Was the distribution done for gain, advantage, or greed? Is sex one of the distributable goods? Sex is an activity, and not something in limited supply that can or cannot be distributed by a society. Therefore, sex is not one of the external goods. William’s example really consists of two actions. The first action is a means to obtain another end. It might be useful here to separate the two out and analyze them separately. The result of the first action was an imbalance in the distribution of wealth. In the second action, the agent desired to obtain sex for himself. If I understand Williams example here, the effect of making an unjust distribution resulted in an advantage over others, and by making an imbalanced distribution put himself in a position to satisfy his desire for sexual conquest or make himself more appealing to others. There results of this combined action are specifically unjust in Aristotle’s sense. The results of the distribution did not end up fairly. Some received less than was their due in this distribution, and thereby they were harmed. Those who received less have a claim against the distributor, hence the act is specifically unjust in Aristotle’s sense.

            Next, how to characterize the motivation. If the agent acted out of hopes for sexual conquest alone, then this is a matter of intemperance. In that general justice is concerned with the virtues in action in their relation to others, this act is also characterizable as intemperate, and thus violates Aristotle’s notion of general justice. But if the motivation was for the hope of sexual conquest by having more of some good and on that account make an unjust distribution to obtain sex then the act was mixed. The distribution resulted in the agent obtaining an advantage over others, and used this to obtain the object of his desire: sex. In sum, we have an act which is both specifically and generally unjust, in the ways described above.

            In second example we find the same type of case. There is a person, who, on one occasion, makes an unjust distribution out of malice against one recipient. Is the act pleonektic? Did the distributor obtain an advantage over others by restricting the amount of the good to one recipient? Again, we have two actions, one a means to achieve another end. Again, the distributor not only obtained more of a good, but also harmed the designated recipient because the distribution was unequal. The recipient who received less was not treated as equal, did not receive the equal share of the good in question. Here, the distributor also gained an advantage over the target of the malice by harming this recipient. Again, this act is generally and specifically unjust in Aristotlean terms. Next, how to characterize the motivation? If the agent acted out of malice towards someone alone, this is a matter of maliciousness. The vice is the excess in relation to good temper, which is concerned with the emotion of anger in action. Because justice is the relation of the virtues in actions to other people, and the act is also characterizable as malicious, and thus violates Aristotelian general justice. Again, we have an act which is both specifically and generally unjust, in the ways described above.

            I argue that Williams first argument moves too quickly to disregard the pleonektic nature of the distribution. Since Williams includes distribution of goods in his examples, as well as other intentions which violate Aristotle’s sense of general justice, Williams’ examples actually have two actions linked together. The specific unjust act is a means to attain a generally unjust end. The results of these distributions themselves require rectificatory justice to address the inequality in the resulting distribution pattern. If, in one sense, social harms are understood as being a product of an unmerited distribution of the social goods, then Williams’ argument fails to account for the resulting imbalance in the distribution pattern and the need for rectificatory justice to address this imbalance.

            In Williams’ second argument, he claims that Aristotle is committed to holding the following positions, and that Aristotle cannot possibly hold (b) and (c) in light of the difference between the characterization of two types of actions (A) and (B) Footnote .

            a) One who knowingly produces an unjust distribution acts unjustly.

            b) The characteristic motive of the vice of injustice is the desire for gain.

c) The difference between (A) acts and (B) acts of injustice is not motive, but only a difference in the dispositional grounding of the motive. Footnote


            To support his second argument, Williams states that there are acts which are unjust, in the particular sense, but are the products of fear, jealously, desire for revenge, etc. Moreover, they may not be episodic but the product of some dispositional trait, and thus the result of some vice other than pleonexia. Footnote His example of this is:

The cowardly man who runs away in battle acts not only in a cowardly way, but also unfairly, and does so because of his cowardice. Unjust acts that are not expressions of the vice of injustice can thus stem from other vices. But the motives characteristic of those other vices are not the motive of pleonexia supposedly characteristic of the vice of injustice. Footnote


Williams’ example of the cowardly man running away from battle is interesting. How is it that someone who throws his shield away in battle is specifically unjust? The description of this action is one where someone acts out of the vice of cowardice. As such, the consequences of the cowardly person’s action results in a disproportionate distribution of safety. Those remaining on the battle line do not benefit from his help in the struggle. So in this sense, there is an objectively specific unjust act. Footnote However, if the person has the settled disposition to flee from battle, that is, he is a coward, then his behavior is generally unjust. The resulting distribution pattern of safety in this case again requires rectificatory justice to address the imbalance resulting from the coward fleeing. Those remaining on the field of battle have had to shoulder the added burden of facing more danger than was their due because of the coward’s fleeing. In fleeing, the coward was only concerned with his own life, and failed to take into consideration the added danger those remaining on the battle line would be left to face.

            Williams example of the cowardly man is the same case that Aristotle uses when he is distinguishing between general and specific justice.

First, if someone’s activities express other vices - if, e.g., cowardice made him throw away his shield, or irritability made him revile someone, or ungenerosity made him fail to help someone with money - what he does is unjust, but not greedy. But when one acts from greed, in many cases his action expresses none of these vices - certainly not all of them; but it still expresses some type of wickedness, since we blame him, and [in particular] it expresses injustice. Hence there is another type of injustice that is a part of the whole, and a way for a thing to be unjust that is a part of the whole that is contrary to law. Moreover, if A commits adultery for profit and makes a profit, while B commits adultery because of his appetite, and spends money on it to his own loss, B seems intemperate, rather than greedy, while A seems unjust, not intemperate. Clearly, then, this is because A acts to make a profit. Further, we can refer every other unjust action to some vice - to intemperance if he committed adultery, to cowardice if he deserted his comrade in the battle-line, to anger if he struck someone. But if he made an [unjust] profit, we can refer it to no other vice except injustice (NE1130a17 - 30 trans. Irwin).

I see Williams interpreting Aristotle here to mean is that in order to be an act of specific injustice, the act must be motivated by pleonexia. If the act is motivated by another vice, it is generally unjust, not specifically unjust. Since we think of the cowardly man running away from battle acting not only cowardly but also unfairly, then pleonexia cannot account for the motivation of the specifically unjust action. Instead, it might be better to think of the profit made by the pleonektic person as profit made at the expense of someone else. If we think in terms of an action having an objectively specific unjust feature, then we can understand the cowardly man’s action as exemplifying the misdistribution of safety. The resulting distribution pattern of safety is unfair, and results in an unfair burden on his comrades who remain in the battle. Thus, the ‘getting more’ here is an objective feature of the resulting distribution pattern of safety. If we bring this analysis to bear on the cases Williams considers, the resulting distribution pattern of the overall action is unbalanced, in the sense that there is an objectively specific unjust action as the result of an agent being vicious. Aristotle’s point, in the passage above, is to distinguish between general and specific unjust acts. He does not make the claim that an act cannot be both generally and specifically unjust. Thus, an act which is generally, but not specifically, unjust will be such in reference to one of the other vices, and there will be no element of pleonexia involved. If there is some advantage, greed, grasping, and none of the other vices apply to express the blameworthiness of the act, then we have a case of specific injustice. But in these cases sited by Williams, there is an action the results of which produce some unwarranted or undeserved gain that is then the means to another action which stems from one of the other vices. Hence, the reason that I suggest that they are combined actions. Williams does not take into consideration the resulting imbalances in the distribution pattern of the social goods and the need for rectificatory justice to address them.

            Williams final argument rejects pleonexia as a motive all together. He says that the unjust person generally is not interested in using the concept of justice at all. The unjust person wants more, but not in comparison with others, but more than what she has. If I understand Williams to mean that the unjust person is indifferent to the claims of others with regards to external goods, and is only concerned with obtaining as much of these goods as possible, then in this sense, Williams is correct. The selfish person desires to satisfy her appetites by obtaining as much as possible of wealth, honor, or safety. By not taking others into consideration, Williams is correct in his description of the unjust person not being interested in the concept of justice. However, does that mean that the results of the actions of someone not interested in justice are themselves not unjust? If I am interested in my own safety, and flee from battle, then I am not motivated by the desire to have more safety than others, but desire to have as much safety for myself as possible. By wanting as much safety as possible, I, in fact, am exposing others to a greater amount of danger. The results of wanting as much safety as possible is a misdistribution of safety, and exemplifies the objectively specifically unjust aspect of my action.

            In this analysis, Williams focuses on the psychology of the unjust person. However in order to determine whether the acts are generally unjust or specifically unjust Aristotle requires us to closely attend to the intentions of the unjust person. To simply describe a person as wanting more does not necessarily mean that the person is unjust. Someone might be ambitious, and apply herself to the business of obtaining wealth, and not cheat anyone in the process, and thus do nothing that would justify calling her unjust. If we understand the motivating desire for specific justice to be the desire that everyone have a share in some socially available good proportionately equal with others, then the pleonektic person’s desire for more results in an imbalanced distribution. The resulting imbalanced distribution requires rectification whether the pleonektic person is or is not consciously desiring more than her fair share.

            Finally, Williams objects to the vagueness of the term “pleonexia” itself. The example that he uses to back up his claim concerns Aristotle’s third divisible good, safety. Williams argues that it is not the case of someone wanting more safety than others, but as much safety as possible. The discussion of wanting safety hinges on conceiving of safety in terms of suffering no bodily harm. When he discusses someone removing someone else from the fall out shelter to obtain safety, Williams concedes his point to Aristotle.

            Hence, Williams’ objection rests on two errors as I see it. First he does not attend to the fact that his examples of actions that allegedly are not motivated by pleonexia are actually two actions described as one where there is a sense of general injustice and specific injustice. Second, if these arguments are supposed to undermine specific justice as a moral virtue, then the resulting imbalanced distributions of external goods require another form of specific justice to correct this. Therefore, by highlighting the need for rectificatory justice, which is also a form of specific justice, to restore the imbalance of the external goods, his argument fails. When he calls into question whether pleonexia is a motivation at all, he fails to notice that there is a subject matter and a particular vice Aristotle is capturing with pleonexia that deserves attention. In so far as the selfish person does not take the claims of others into consideration with regard to the accumulation of wealth or one of the other socially distributable goods, Williams brings out an interesting insight into the psychology of the unjust person. But he fails to consider the need for rectificatory justice to address the unmerited distribution, and, if his argument is intended to reject Aristotle’s analysis of specific justice all together, it fails accordingly.

 


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